Public Land & Resources Law Review
Volume 39

Article 4

October 2018

Streamlining the Production of Clean Energy: Proposals to Reform
the Hydroelectricity Licensing Process
Travis Kavulla
Laura Farkas

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Agriculture Law Commons, Animal Law Commons, Cultural
Heritage Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Indigenous,
Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Oil,
Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Kavulla, Travis and Farkas, Laura (2018) "Streamlining the Production of Clean Energy: Proposals to
Reform the Hydroelectricity Licensing Process," Public Land & Resources Law Review: Vol. 39 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr/vol39/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Public Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at
University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Streamlining the Production of Clean Energy: Proposals to Reform
the Hydroelectricity Licensing Process
Travis Kavulla* and Laura Farkas**
Hydroelectric power is an efficient and clean source of power. In an era
when air emissions dominate public concern about the environmental
effects of the energy sector, it is a paradox that among the most highly
regulated energy projects are hydroelectric dams, which do not combust
fuel. This is partly due to a failure of successive statutory enactments,
which have transformed hydroelectric licensing from a regulatory “onestop shop” with a single regulator, to a process chained to a bewildering
number of often conflicting regulatory agencies, often riven with delay.
Hydroelectric licensing has also failed because its capacious standard of
review encourages special-interest groups with even a marginal interest
to seek rents from regulated users. Even with the introduction of dispute
resolution, and the possibility of obtaining exemptions, the barriers to
hydroelectric permitting and relicensing are excessive. Fortunately, a
number of reforms would ease the regulatory burden on hydroelectric
power expansion, while still considering and addressing environmental
concerns.
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I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF HYDROELECTRIC
LICENSING
A. History
Hydropower regulation in the United States was born with the
passage of the 1902 Reclamation Act. The Reclamation Act reversed the
previous practice of exclusive state and local involvement in reclaiming
land and created the Bureau of Reclamation. 1 After passage of the Act,
the federal government funded irrigation projects across the country.
Irrigation techniques advanced, including pumping, which would drive
demand for future development of hydroelectric facilities.2 The
Reclamation Act ushered in the age of federal involvement in water
projects, but the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 (FWPA), which
1.
Keith H. Beauchamp, A History of Drainage and Draining
Methods, HISTORY, STATUS AND PROSPECTS 29, 34 (George A. Pavelis ed., 1987)
available at https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED295043.
2.
Id. at 43.
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codified regulation of hydropower projects, cemented federal jurisdiction.3
In 1930, Congress established the Federal Power Commission, now
known as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In 1935,
Congress passed the Federal Power Act (FPA), which granted to the
Federal Power Commission and its successor agency, FERC, the authority
to regulate interstate transmission and the sale of electricity at wholesale.4
Under the FPA, FERC is also tasked with providing licenses for nonfederal hydroelectric plants.5
Hydroelectric development by the federal government itself
increased in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1933, the Tennessee Valley
Authority was established.6 The Great Depression, as well as flooding and
drought in the West, prompted the building of large multipurpose water
projects, including the Grand Coulee Dam, the Hoover Dam, and the
Central Valley Project.7 The impressive Fort Peck Dam, the first in a
series of dams built on the Missouri River, was also constructed.8 In 1937,
the Bonneville Power Administration was established and the Bonneville
Lock and Dam began operation.9 In the 1940s, bolstered by the New Deal,
hydropower accounted for 40 percent of electrical generation in the United
States.10 The momentum did not last, however, and by the 1960s, the
preservation movement, emerging environmental concerns, and the

3.
Gifford Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water
Power Legislation, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 19 (1946).
4.
Id. at 20.
5.
16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1935).
6.
Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Water Power
Technologies Office, History of Hydropower, U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY,
https://energy.gov/eere/water /history-hydropower (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
7.
Bureau of Reclamation, Hydropower Program: The History of
Hydropower Development in the U.S., https://www.usbr.gov/power/edu/history.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Hydropower Program].
8.
Bureau of Reclamation, Lewis and Clark: Big Dam Era,
https://www.usbr.gov/gp/lewisandclark/damera.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
9.
Bonneville Power Admin., History, https://www.bpa.gov/news/
AboutUs/History/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
10.
Hydropower Program, supra note 9.
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diminishing number of available sites ended the era of big federal dams.11
Today, most dams in the United States are privately owned.12
B. The Co-Mingling of Environmental Law in the FERC Licensing
Scheme
The earlier era of hydropower was characterized by laws that
promoted the widespread availability of electricity, and the place of FERC
as an agency intended to promote the construction of energy infrastructure
and the interconnection of customers to sources of supply at reasonable
rates.13 FERC was fundamentally an economic regulator favorably
disposed to the abundance of supply. In the 1970s, however, growing
distress regarding the natural environment led to the passage of a flurry of
environmental laws. None of these laws were aimed specifically at
hydroelectric development or regulation. Nevertheless, they have shaped
hydroelectric project licensing and relicensing profoundly. One of the
most iconic pieces of environmental legislation is the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA became effective in 1970, and
was the first of a succession of environmental laws enacted during that
time.14 The three key features of NEPA include the requirement that
federal agencies consider the environmental consequences of any
proposed action; the requirement that federal agencies prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) examining the environmental
effects of any major action; and the formation of the President’s Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ).15 The CEQ has since promulgated
regulations that further articulate how the procedural provisions of NEPA

11.
Dan Tarlock, The Legal-Political Barriers to Ramping Up Hydro,
86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 259, 267-268 (2011).
12.
Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Dam Ownership in the U.S.,
https://www.fema.gov/dam-ownership-united-states (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
13.
16 U.S.C. § 824 et seq. (1935).
14.
William V. Luneburg, National Environmental Policy Act (1969),
in 3 Major Acts of Congress 16-20 (Brian K. Landsberg ed., 2004) available at
link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/CX3407400215/UHIC?u=j071909004&xid=657f8a07.
15.
Id. at 18.
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are to be implemented.16 Under NEPA and its associated regulations,
FERC must undergo a review of environmental impacts and generally
must prepare an environmental assessment (EA) or EIS before issuing a
license for a hydroelectric project. Guidelines on the preparation of
environmental documents illuminate the complex nature of the process.17
On the heels of NEPA came the Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA),
an impactful piece of legislation when it comes to FERC hydropower
licensing and relicensing. Its significance stems from the requirement
contained in Section 401 that an applicant for a federal license provide a
certification from a state or tribe to certify that any discharges from the
facility will comply with the CWA.18 In S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board
of Environmental Protection, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
hydroelectric dams are subject to Section 401.19 Thus, the legislation
provides a vehicle for states to impose conditions on FERC-issued
hydroelectric licenses.
Shortly after the CWA, Congress passed the Endangered Species
Act (ESA) in 1973.20 The ESA requires FERC to consult with other
federal agencies, and ensure that the issuance of a hydroelectric license
will not pose a risk to a threatened or endangered species.21 Complying
with the ESA when seeking a hydroelectric license is demanding.22

16.
40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2018).
17.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n Office of Energy Projects,
Preparing Environmental Documents Guidelines for Applicants, Contractors, and
Staff (Sept. 2008), available at https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info
/guidelines/eaguide.pdf.
18.
Fed. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-500, § 401, 86 Stat. 816, 877 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018)).
19.
547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006).
20.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2018).
21.
Susan A. Moore, Hydro Licensing and the Endangered Species
Act: Implications of FERC’s Current Approach (June 1, 2007) available at
http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/hr/print/volume-26/issue-3/feature-articles/fercregulations/hydro-licensing-and-the-endangered-species-act-implications-offercrsquos-current-approach.html.
22.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n Office of Energy Projects,
Hydropower Licensing and Endangered Species: A Guide for Applicants,
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Through the ESA, other federal agencies have become de facto coregulators in the FERC licensing and relicensing process.
Finally, despite its nominal irrelevance to environmental issues,
the Electric Consumer Protection Act (ECPA) of 1986 opened the
floodgates to the involvement of still other federal and state agencies, often
with very different goals than those of FERC, who continue to wield major
influence in the licensing process. Specifically, the statute added new
language that requires FERC to seek out and consider input from state and
federal agencies tasked with resource management.23 They became
powerful players in the process. The legislative history of the bill indicates
that this was the intent; these amendments were intended to ensure that the
recommendations received from resource management agencies would
not be easily flouted.24 The ECPA succeeded in removing a great deal of
FERC’s prior discretion.
The key pieces of legislation outlined above have each contributed
to creating the decentralized FERC hydroelectric licensing and relicensing
process that exists today. Yet, even these laws do not represent the entirety
of legislation responsible for shaping the process that exists today. All
told, seeking an original hydroelectric license, or a subsequent one,
requires engaging in a process that is prolonged and onerous.
C. The Three FERC Licensing Processes
There are technically three processes available to obtain a new
hydroelectric license, or to obtain a relicense. These processes are: the
Integrated Licensing Process (ILP); the Traditional Licensing Process
(TLP); and the Alternative Licensing Process (ALP).25 The default process
Contractors, and Staff (2001) available at https://www.ferc.gov/industries/
hydropower/gen-info/guidelines/esa_guide.pdf.
23.
Echeverria, John D. “The Electric Consumers Protection Act of
1986,” 8 Energy L.J. 61, 72 (1987).
24.
Id.
25.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Licensing Processes,
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/licen-pro.asp
(last
visited Jan. 17, 2018).
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is the ILP, but with FERC approval, one can pursue either the TLP
or ALP.26
The TLP is the oldest of the three. It requires a consultation
process to be completed before an application can be filed, however it is
the least front-loaded of the three.27 There is little involvement from
FERC prior to an application being submitted.28 Reduced to a handful of
steps, FERC represents the regulatory procedure in a deceivingly simple
form.29 Ironically, the lack of heavy FERC involvement, especially at
points at which the applicant must deal with stakeholders, allows
interested parties to slow the process considerably.
FERC issued regulations in 1997 establishing alternative licensing
processes.30 In contrast to the TLP, the ALP’s regulatory process is far
more front-loaded. It is intended to be more collaborative and flexible.
FERC acts as the adult in the room, requiring progress reports and playing
the role of arbiter by resolving disputes during the pre-filing consultation
phase.31 The ALP, unlike the TLP, also combines into one process the
consultation phase, the environmental review process required by NEPA,
and the administrative processes associated with the CWA and other statutes.32
Finally, the ILP is the newest process.33 It was intended to
26.
Id.
27.
18 C.F.R. §§ 4.38(a)(1), 16.8(a)(1) (2018).
28.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Processes for Hydropower
Licenses: Traditional Licensing Process: Applicant’s Pre-Filing Process,
https://www.ferc.gov/resources/processes/flow/hydro-1.asp (last visited Jan. 17,
2018).
29.
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Processes for Hydropower Licenses:
Traditional Licensing Process: FERC Application Process, FED. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMM’N., https://www.ferc.gov/resources/processes/flow/hydro-2.asp
(last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
30.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Guidelines to Consider for
Participating in the Alternative Licensing Process iv, https://www.ferc.gov/
industries/hydropower/indus-act/itf/alp_final.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
31.
18 C.F.R. § 4.34(i)(2)(ii).
32.
Id. § 4.34(i)(1).
33.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., News Release: Commission
Adopts New Hydro Licensing Process With Promise of Faster, More Informed

130

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 39

streamline hydro project licensing.34 The ILP, like the ALP, is also heavily
front-loaded. Applicants face many requirements, with tight timeframes,
prior to filing an application.35 These quick turnaround times are meant to
drive the process forward, but pose a significant burden on applicants. The
pre-filing consultation requirements are detailed. Similar to the ALP’s
dispute resolution provision, in the ILP, FERC will insert itself into the
process if formal resolution of a study36 dispute is necessary.37 However,
this leaves other potential disputes without an arbiter. The ILP’s almost
exclusive focus is on avoiding the need for superfluous and post-filing
studies, which is admirable. This goal is one of the reasons the
introduction of the ILP was met with some optimism.38 However, upon
examination, the ILP, like the ALP, simply shifts the lion’s share of the
labor from later in the process, to earlier. The ILP is less collaborative than
the ALP. The ILP entails an approximately five-year process before an
applicant can even file for a license. During this period, the applicant’s
time is largely spent pacifying stakeholders. The hope is that disputes will
be worked out prior to filing, expediting the wait time for the issuance of
a license. Yet despite the significant effort expended at the start, the postfiling process is still rather extensive.39 Moreover, applicants still face the
likely need for an EA after filing, which opens the process up to further

Decisions, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/indus-act/order-2002/pressrelease.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
34.
Id.
35.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Processes for Hydropower
Licenses: 5-5.5 years before expiration for relicense, https://www.ferc.gov/resources/
processes/flow/hydro-5.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
36.
Studies are requested by interested parties and conducted by FERC
as part of FERC’s consultation requirements under Section 7 of the ESA and Section
401 of the CWA, pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 5.9.
37.
18 C.F.R. § 5.14 (2018).
38.
Michael A Swiger, and Megan M. Grant, Creating a New FERC
Licensing Process (May 2004) available at http://64.106.168.122/webfiles/
MAS.HydroReview.May.2004.pdf.
39.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Processes for Hydropower
Licenses: 2 years before expiration for relicense, https://www.ferc.gov/resources/
processes/flow/hydro-6.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
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public participation.40
Regardless of which process applicants choose, they can expect to
invest considerable time and resources, and in the case of the ALP and ILP
large resource expenditures will occur before one can even submit an
application. In certain situations, a project may qualify for an exemption
from licensing.41 However, an exempted project is still subject to
mandatory terms and conditions set by federal and state fish and wildlife
agencies.42
D. The Decline in FERC’s Exclusive Authority Over Hydroelectric
Licensing
FERC has authority under the FPA to issue licenses for nonfederal hydroelectric projects.43 FERC’s hydroelectric licensing power
was initially all-encompassing. In 1954, the United States Supreme Court
determined that in the FPA “there is a separation of those subjects which
remain under the jurisdiction of the states from those subjects . . . over
which Congress vests the Federal Power Commission with authority to
act.”44 The Court further found that “[w]here the Federal Government
supersedes the state government there is no suggestion that [the federal
government and states] both shall have final authority.”45 In sum,
“provisions of the [Federal Power Act] providing for the federal plan of
regulation leave no room or need for conflicting state controls.”46 This
landmark case acknowledged FERC’s preemption of authority over
hydroelectric project licensing. FERC’s power was further affirmed in

40.
18 C.F.R. § 5.25 (2018).
41.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Exemptions from Licensing,
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/exemptions.asp (last
visited Jan. 18, 2018).
42.
Id.
43.
16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2005).
44.
First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op. v. Federal Power Commission, 328
U.S. 152, 167 (1946).
45.
Id. at 168.
46.
Id. at 181.
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California v. FERC, where the United States Supreme Court ruled that
California’s lower stream flow requirements on a river where a FERC
licensed hydroelectric project was located were preempted by the FPA. 47
However, FERC’s abundant hydroelectric licensing power has
eroded over the years. The flurry of environmental laws enacted in the
1970s, and the ECPA, which amended the FPA, drastically reduced
FERC’s authority over hydroelectric licensing. Significant power was
placed in the hands of the states, via the CWA’s “401 certificate”
requirement.48 Without one, no license can be granted.49 Essentially, a
state’s conditions become part of a FERC hydroelectric license. Prior to
the environmental legislation of the 1970s and the ECPA, FERC was
already required to consider “the purposes of energy conservation, the
protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife
. . . the protection of recreational opportunities, and the preservation of
other aspects of environmental quality.”50 Certain federal agencies had
the power to prescribe conditions on projects located in or affecting federal
reservations.51 The ECPA then required FERC to consider the
recommendations of federal and state agencies on matters of “flood
control, navigation, irrigation, recreation, cultural and other relevant
resources.”52 Further, the ECPA directed that hydroelectric licenses “shall
include conditions for such protection, mitigation, and enhancement” of
fish and wildlife.53 To that end, such conditions must be based on
recommendations from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),

47.
495 U.S. 490, 506 (1990).
48.
33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1977).
49.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a).
50.
16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2005).
51.
16 U.S.C. § 796(2) (“Reservation” means “national forests, tribal
lands embraced within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other lands and
interests in lands owned by the United States, and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld
from private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws; also lands and
interests in lands acquired and held for any public purposes; but shall not include
national monuments or national parks.”)
52.
16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1992).
53.
16 U.S.C. § 803(j)(1).
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part of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), part of the U.S. Department of Interior, as well
as state fish and wildlife agencies.54 Finally, both NMFS and FWS gained
the authority to prescribe facilities for fish passage, such as fish ladders,
and other conditions that they deem necessary in order to effectuate
successful fish passage.55 This is in addition to the federal agency
participation necessitated by NEPA, the CWA, and the ESA. The
environmental laws of the 1970s and the ECPA turned FERC’s role from
sole arbiter to a mere first among equals.
FERC resisted its shrinking control of the hydroelectric licensing
process, but was dealt a series of blows by the federal courts. The United
States Supreme Court ruled unequivocally that FERC is required to accept,
without modification, conditions that the Secretary of Interior deems
necessary for the protection of Indian reservations.56 In PUD No. 1 of
Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, the Court
affirmed a state’s ability to include water quality standards in a FERC
hydroelectric license.57 Then, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed that FERC cannot exclude state CWA certification conditions
from hydroelectric licenses.58 Finally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that FERC lacks authority to reject fishway prescriptions as
conditions upon reissued hydroelectric licenses.59 All of these cases
served to cement the involvement of state and federal resource agencies in
the FERC hydroelectric licensing process. Despite the fact that, as the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged, “Congress passed the
Federal Water Power Act in order to eliminate the inefficiency and
confusion caused by the ‘piecemeal, restrictive, negative approach’ to

54.
Id.
55.
16 U.S.C. § 811 (2005).
56.
Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual,
Pauma, and Pala Bands of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 773-776, (1984).
57.
511 U.S. 700 (1994).
58.
Am. Rivers, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 1997).
59.
Am. Rivers v. FERC, 201 F. 3d 1186, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000).
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licensing,”60 relevant federal law and case law has essentially achieved a
return to the “inefficiency and confusion” that the FWPA was originally
intended to resolve.
II. HYDROELECTRIC LICENSING’S FALSE PROMISE OF
REGULATION IN THE ‘PUBLIC INTEREST’
A. The Ever-Expanding Public Interest
The U.S. Department of Energy has observed that “the
hydropower regulatory environment has evolved over time rather than
having been planned and implemented at one point in time as a unified,
fully efficient, integrated process.”61 This is an understatement. The
generation of electricity by hydropower is perhaps the purest example of
Ronald Coase’s observation that the products “traded on the market are
not, as is often supposed by economists, physical entities but the rights to
perform certain actions[,] and the rights which individuals possess are
established by the legal system.”62 Hydroelectric licensing is governed by
a capacious “public interest” standard under Section 10 of the FPA, and a
series of other standards that the subsequent acts described above have
given rise to. While licenses are issued bureaucratically by a single
agency, FERC, they require the imprimatur of a variety of federal and state
natural-resource agencies, each of which have their own institutional
interests which are narrower than the public interest writ large. Other than
government agencies, many stakeholders also claim to have interests

60.
Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual,
Pauma, and Pala Bands of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 773 (1984) (quoting First
Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op, 328 U.S. at 180).
61.
U.S. Dept. of Energy, Hydropower Vision, https://www.energy.
gov/sites/prod/files/2016/10/f33/Hydropower-Vision-Chapter-4-10212016.pdf (last
visited Jan. 18, 2018).
62.
Ronald H. Coase, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991: Prize Lecture (Dec. 9, 1991) available at
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1991/coaselecture.html.
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entailed by “the public interest” along or besides waterways. FERC, the
regulator, is responsible for enmeshing this accumulation of claims within
a license as conditions. Each condition weighs against the wider
economics of the project—the requirement for fisheries, or waterfowl
brood areas, or recreational boating sites all imposing costs on the
licensee—so that the hydroelectric licensing process is also a fine example
of what Richard Posner called “taxation by regulation.”63 Since customers
typically bear the licensee’s costs through public utility regulation, the
many conditions attendant to licensing can be understood to “compel
members of the public to support a service that the market would provide
at a reduced level, or not at all.”64 Finally, these licenses are time-limited
by statute,65 and they cannot be transferred except through a similar
regulatory process.66
These three regulatory features—a capacious standard of review,
the many cooks in the kitchen, and the always looming prospect of a
decade-long relicensure process—have resulted in a temporary, nontransferable, and conditional property right for the licensee. A highly
attenuated right to perform a certain action of the type Coase describes,
an interested party obtains this license only through a significant outlay
associated not just with the cost to build and operate a project, but also
with the transaction costs associated with obtaining that right by satisfying
conditions whose value usually lacks an objective yardstick. This
regulatory process serves the whole of the public interest to an only
questionable extent, as a real-life example of it demonstrates.

63.
Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science 22, 29 (1971).
64.
Id.
65.
16 U.S.C. § 799 (1980).
66.
18 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq.
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B. Case Study: The Kilarc-Cow Creek Project
The two small dams that together comprised the 4.6-megawatt
Kilarc-Cow Creek project in California are a case study in the convoluted
regulatory process that exists for small hydroelectric facilities. When the
century-old project faced another license renewal in the early 2000s,
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)’s preliminary investigation concluded that
the project would face substantial opposition from federal agencies and
environmental interest groups unless conditions associated with fish were
attached to the relicense. Instead, the utility, California’s largest, opted to
propose to decommission the project.67
Although hydroelectric relicensing is intended to be a highly
public process, the mere prospect of the conditions that might arise out of
this process led PG&E to pre-emptively elect to not even attempt obtaining
Kilarc-Cow Creek’s renewal. Instead, PG&E decided on a course to
surrender it.68 Paradoxically, the public nature of the relicensing process
appears to have foreclosed its occurrence at all and deprived members of
the public a significant opportunity to urge the project’s continuation.69
67.
Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., Kilarc-Cow Creek Hydroelectric Project
Preliminary Proposed Decommissioning Plan (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.kilarccowcreek.com/Lists/Announcements/Attachments/4/3008806_PGandE_Kilarc%20
cow_PPDP_09-10-07.pdf
68.
Letter from Annette Faragalia to Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n. (Mar. 30, 2005), Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., available at http://www.kilarccowcreek.com/Document%20Library/Decommissioning%20Documents%20and%
20Comments%20Received/Decommissioning%20Agreements/CC_033105Agreeme
ntFERCFiling.pdf.
69.
One member of the public commented during the EIS process to
examine PG&E’s decommissioning proposal, “I was very saddened by the suggestion
of closing Kilarc. Our daughter and granddaughter both caught their first fish at Kilarc.
It was the one place that my mother could walk into to fish, which she dearly loved to
do… I do hope this decision is reconsidered.” The utility responded: “The FERC
licensing process does not allow PG&E a further opportunity to renew its operating
license. PG&E elected not to apply for a new license and the deadline for relicensing
the Kilarc-Cow Creek Project has passed.” Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Draft
Responses to Comments Received on Preliminary Proposed Decommissioning Plan,
2 (Sept. 12, 2007) available at http://www.kilarccowcreek.com/Document%
20Library/Decommissioning%20Documents%20and%20Comments%20Received/C
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Although not readily accessible, the utility’s assumptions about what it
would cost to renew the license must have been very substantial because
the ultimate cost to PG&E and its ratepayers to decommission the project
amounted to $9 million, or nearly $2,000 per kilowatt of installed capacity,
plus whatever amount it spent to replace the lost generation.70 The
decommissioning cost alone exceeds the capital cost of a new natural-gas
fired plant on a per-kilowatt basis.71 In other words, it likely cost PG&E
more to decommission a hydroelectric plant than to build a new gas plant,
and yet the utility nonetheless elected not to seek a renewal of the project
license, suggesting the extremely high cost predicted to relicense the
facility.
Once PG&E submitted its application to surrender the license,
FERC assembled a draft EIS pursuant to NEPA. After receiving
comments, it dismissed a proposal from a firm apparently more ambitious
than PG&E to receive the license and preserve the facility for future
hydroelectric generation. It issued a final EIS that granted PG&E its
request to surrender its license and ordered work to be done to remove
facilities that impeded fish passage along the waterways.
The Final EIS can be understood as the locus of regulation for this
project. The document is a strange amalgam of highly nuanced analysis
of certain aspects of hydroelectric operations, with almost a blind eye to
others. Notably, in a document spanning 342 pages, regulators spent all
omment%20Response%20Table/Kilarc-Cow_Creek_PPDP_Comment_Response_
Table.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
70.
Final Envtl. Impact Statement for Hydropower License Surrender,
Kilarc-Cow Creek Hydroelectric Project, FERC Project No. 606, xxiv (Aug. 2011)
available at https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/enviro/eis/2011/08-16-11.
asp.
71.
For example, Montana’s NorthWestern Energy reports a combined
cycle combustion turbine, used to produce energy on a more consistent basis, costs
$1,400 per kilowatt of capacity, while a flexible peaking unit that uses an internal
combustion engine, costs $1,280. MONT. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, NorthWestern Energy:
2015 Electricity Supply Resource Procurement Plan, PSC. MT.gov, Docket No.
N2015.11.91, p. 9-3 (Mar. 2016) available at http://psc.mt.gov/Docs/Electronic
Documents/pdfFiles/N20151191-AbsarokaEnergyCommentsNWE2015Plan.pdf (last
visited Jan. 18, 2018).
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of 45 words on their analysis of the emission effects of the power plant’s
continued operations.72 Despite putative concern with environmental
effects, the regulatory process selectively concentrated on fisheries and
land use issues. The process, in this way, was the opposite of “think
globally, act locally.”
In the case of Kilarc-Cow Creek, the regulator waived off
concerns about emissions as de minimus. The project was, the Final EIS
found, a mere 0.2% of PG&E’s overall power generation portfolio, and
only 0.12% of the state’s hydroelectric generation.73 It is true that, in the
scope of power generation, Kilarc-Cow Creek was a small project.
However, to undertake a small measure of the work which the regulator
did not do, we estimated that this very small project’s continued operation
would have abated about 16,000 tons of carbon-dioxide annually, the
equivalent of the emissions of 3,000 cars per year.74
72.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., supra note 70, at 209.
73.
Id. at 208-09.
74.
The authors made this calculation using 2016 data within the
EPA’s AVERT tool, which is an Excel-based model that allows users to input the
estimated production of a renewable resource to show which emissions from the
portfolio of power plants in a region—in this case California—are avoided by the
renewable plant’s operation. Notably, EPA’s model has built-in production profiles
for wind, utility-scale, and roof-top solar, yet it seems not even to countenance the
role hydropower might play in abating emissions.
The authors derived a round-the-clock estimate of megawatt production in
an average hour by dividing the project’s reported annual production of 31,100
megawatt-hours by 8,760 (the number of hours in the year). The quotient is the sole
variable that the AVERT model requires to make an estimate of emissions, although
the authors could undertake a significantly more refined estimate if they were to use
the project’s hourly production profile. Since our point is that none of its regulators
studied these effects at all, we found a flyspeck analysis such at this unnecessarily
burdensome for this demonstrative point.
A hydropower project’s avoided emissions, of course, will be both a product
of the amount of energy it produces, when it produces that energy, and where in the
nation’s grid it produces it, since each region has a different set of resources creating
emissions. For example, the iteration of AVERT tool we used has a 2016 data set for
California. If one assumes that California is less reliant on emitting resources today
than it had been when Kilarc-Cow was decommissioned, the avoided carbon
emissions of the project would have been higher.
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Imagine, however, the regulator’s logic being extended to the
myriad other issues which arise in the context of hydroelectric licensing,
from recreation, to fish passage, to the effect on irrigation, to the
preservation of historic landmarks. The entirety of the project’s negative
and positive effects could have been said to be de minimus because the
project impacts only a small area which has no endemic species or
particularly unique features. Yet the project’s effects on biological and
cultural resources received, throughout the Kilarc-Cow Creek EIS, a
detailed, flyspeck analysis that includes many lengthy discussions of the
optimal water temperatures for various non-endangered fish species and
the amount of stocking of these species that has occurred for recreation.
Were one to have extended the de minimus excusal that is the centerpiece
of the regulator’s analysis on carbon emissions to this substance, it would
have been just as easy to conclude: Go protect the fish elsewhere.
In reading the EIS thoroughly, it becomes obvious that the
regulator failed to engage in a cost-benefit analysis that considered the
trade-offs between the positive and negative effects of the project. The
regulator made no effort to calculate the value to consumers of avoiding
replacement generation or the value of the positive environmental benefits
the project created. In doing so, despite the EIS’s page count, the regulator
could not have made an educated guess about the trade-offs of the various
alternatives the EIS considered, which included one to preserve the
project’s powerhouse for a future licensee’s use.
To be clear, we are not necessarily arguing that FERC should have
relicensed the Kilarc-Cow Creek project. Instead, we merely submit that
a utility’s preemptive decision to surrender the license is indicative of how
The annual production of Kilarc-Cow was reported in a trade press account
of the project’s decommissioning. Final FERC EIS endorses removal of 4.6-MW
Kilarc-Cow Creek, http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/2011/08/final-ferc-eisendorses-removal-of-4-6-mw-kilarc-cow-creek.html (Aug. 25, 2011). The
comparison estimate for vehicles derives from the EPA’s estimate of an average
annual carbon-emissions of a passenger vehicle. Envtl. Protection Agency,
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from a Typical Passenger Vehicle, https://www.epa.gov/
greenvehicles/greenhouse-gas-emissions-typical-passenger-vehicle-0 (last visited
Feb. 9, 2018).

140

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 39

poorly the process works. It likely disadvantages members of the public
such as the grandfather who reminisced about fishing access—people that
the U.S. Department of Energy euphemistically labels “non-technical
stakeholders” in its review of hydroelectric licensing.75 The hydroelectric
regulatory process may also lose sight of the public interest as a whole,
with respect to carbon-dioxide emissions, in favor of interest groups that
purport to represent the public, but who may merely represent a narrower
interest.76 Similarly, the Kilarc-Cow Creek case study is a fine example
of NEPA’s implementation flaws, where the EIS is a document which silos
individual aspects of the project’s positive and negative effects, not
effectively engaging in any economic analysis to trade them off against
one another. It also focuses laser-like on some effects, while essentially
ignoring others. The EIS, as a whole, is a testament to the institutional
subjectivity of a regulator who possesses an overly broad mandate to
consider “the public interest,” where, ironically, the whole goes largely
unconsidered because of institutional preferences to focus on certain
effects over others.
C. When the ‘Public Interest’ Isn’t the Public’s Interest
Kilarc-Cow Creek is not the only example of a licensing process
which loses sight of the big picture. In February 2017, Oroville Dam’s
spillway catastrophically ruptured in the wake of significant rainfall in
California, water spilled over the top of the project’s weir, and an
emergency spillway had to be used for the first time since the project’s
construction five decades before.77 While the events unfolded over several
days’ time, the threat of the spillway eroding or collapsing led to the risk
75.
U.S. Dep’t. of Energy, supra note 56, at 387.
76.
Supra note 71 (for the public comment this observation alludes to);
supra note 69 (for the letter to FERC, which indicated that PG&E’s agreement to preemptively and voluntarily surrender its license had only two non-governmental, public
groups, which were Trout Unlimited and Friends of the River).
77.
Independent Forensic Team Report: Oroville Dam Spillway
Incident 9 (Jan. 5, 2018) https://damsafety.org/sites/default/files/files/ Independent
%20Forensic%20Team%20Report%20Final%2001-05-18.pdf.
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of an enormous flood. Authorities ordered an evacuation of the area
downriver, inhabited by 188,000 people.78
Oroville’s license expired more than a decade ago, in January
2007, and the project has been in limbo ever since, subject to periodic,
temporary renewals. This is despite the fact that a final settlement
agreement was signed by 51 different institutional stakeholders, a veritable
playground of special interests from bicyclists, to canoers, to horseback
riders, to environmentalists, to the Rotary Club, and the U.S. Department
of Interior.79 The project’s relicensing website even has videos showing
the fanfare of the March 2006 celebratory signing ceremony.80 Despite an
EIS having been completed in the same year as the settlement agreement,
the project’s relicense has remained pending due to other federal agencies’
lackadaisical work flow, including a biological opinion from the NMFS, a
439-page opus that was released only in December 2016.81 The license
continues to await final federal approval. Like other settlements and
licensing orders, the still-pending settlement agreement for the relicense is
a hodgepodge of conditions representing the interests of those agreeing to
settlement, whose interests may not necessarily be synonymous with a
perspective on the whole of the public interest. It is noteworthy, given the
recent events at Oroville Dam, that the settlement contains more detail in
its discussion of the four waterfowl brood ponds, which are to be a
condition of the license, than it does on the new requirement for an “early
warning system” to coordinate the assortment of federal agencies and

78.
Tony Bizjak, Mass chaos of Oroville evacuation prompts worry
over exit strategy, Sacramento Bee (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.sacbee.com/news/
local/transportation/back-seat-driver/article133485154.html.
79.
Cal. Dep’t. of Water Res., Final Settlement Agreement (Mar. 21,
2006), http://www.water.ca.gov/orovillerelicensing/ settlement_agreement.cfm.
80.
Id.
81.
US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, Orville Facilities Biological Opinion (Dec 5. 2016),
available at http://www.water.ca.gov/hlpco/docs/2017/20161205_NMFS_P2100_
Aquatic%20Biological%20Opinion.pdf.
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emergency responders “before and during flood emergency events.”82
Unlike the meticulous detail it specifies for other conditions, the settlement
calls for the details of the early warning system to be worked out later—
one year after the license’s issuance.83 Since the license has been pending
for 11 years, it apparently has never been consummated.
The whole process is even more surreal when one considers that
the licensee is not a private party, but the State of California. One would
think the state sovereign would be capable of representing the public
interest on its own, and yet oddly, its license is a vehicle for rent-seeking
within a federal process. While FERC has a rigorous dam safety regime,
and its response to the Oroville near-catastrophe has been commendable,
the dam’s licensing saga is another notable example of a process that loses
sight of truly important features of the project’s most significant public
impacts. The dawdling approach to the relicense freezes many improvements in the pendency of a long regulatory proceeding.
In balancing the many interests present within the licensing
process, the regulator has an assortment of federal law to look to. For
example, the ESA places an almost incalculably high value on the
preservation of listed species. It would not be lawful for a regulator, on
its own authority, to countermand a listing decision made (by another
regulator) pursuant to this statute. Elsewhere, the mandate for “the public
interest” is vague. How, for example, to calculate the social value of
recreational opportunities, which feature prominently in many hydro
licenses? Problematically, FERC has not created any real metric for this
style of regulation, instead relying on stakeholders merely to raise their
hand in order to extract a condition.
Montana’s Mystic Dam, for example, is required by a U.S. Forest
Service licensing condition to establish a “whitewater flow plan to

82.
Settlement Agreement for Licensing of the Oroville Facilities,
FERC Project No. 2100 (March 2006), available at http://www.water.ca.gov/
orovillerelicensing/settlement_agreement.cfm (Compare pp. A36-37 (waterfowl
brood ponds) to A41-42 (early warning system).
83.
Id.
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improve whitewater boating opportunities.”84 FERC’s order does not
describe why such a condition is in the public interest. Yet, the tacit
premise appears to be that the condition restores a recreational opportunity
that kayakers would have availed themselves of had a dam not been
constructed in 1925 and had kayaking been an undertaking enjoyed during
the turn of the last century. The resulting plan for whitewater release is
highly convoluted: the licensee measures downstream flows in cubic-feet
per second (cfs) on Wednesday at noon and if the flow is between 286 and
400 cfs, the licensee will “endeavor to release” 500 cfs for five hours on
the following Saturday and Sunday, except if inflows are rapidly
decreasing at an upstream gauge, in which event it will do so only on
Saturdays, but if flows are between 250 and 285 cfs, the flows will also be
limited to Saturday unless the upstream flows are lower than 250 cfs, in
which event there will be no release at all, which is also the case if the
flows reported downstream are greater than 400 cfs.85 It is, the reader will
observe, rather precise—but the same cannot be said of the decision to
include this requirement in the first place. As with the Kilarc-Cow Creek
Project, the licensing order does not even attempt to engage in cost-benefit
analysis to reason whether the foregone, emissions-free power generation
is worth more, or less, than whatever the whitewater benefits may be.
Perhaps unlike certain biological requirements that may be truly
an issue of the commons, one should assume there is a particularized
compensable value to recreational and certain other interests. In other
words, what would these whitewater kayakers be willing to pay? In such
circumstances, even if the eventual service is going to be subsidized to
some degree by a hydroelectric licensee, it seems reasonable to attempt to
test the market for a willingness to pay rather than putting a regulator in a
position of having to hypothesize the demand for these services and their
84.
Order Issuing New License, Project No. 2301-022, 9 (Dec. 17,
2007) 121 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,198, p. 9 (This condition was imposed by the U.S. Forest
Service’s authority to impose conditions which FERC must adopt, under § 4(e) of the
Federal Power Act.).
85.
NorthWestern Energy, Protocol for West Rosebud Creek
Whitewater Flow Enhancement, http://www.mysticlakeproject/pdf_2015/mysticwhitewater-protocol-NWE.pdf.
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value to the user.
The next part of this paper discusses how the regulatory process
could be streamlined and become less arbitrary. It suffices here to observe
that there are inevitably trade-offs between positive and negative
consequences of any particular hydroelectric project, just as there are with
any piece of the energy industry. There are also trade-offs between pieces
of the complex electric system; less supply from one project will be
backfilled by another. Therefore, it is important to treat hydroelectric
production to no greater, or lesser, scrutiny than other impactful parts of
that industry receive.
As it exists today, FERC and its sister agencies’ regulation is a
nitpicky style of central planning, subsuming each small detail of a
project’s existence. This amoebic regulation may purport to balance
divergent interests, but on close examination, such an undertaking is really
a series of blind guesses in the absence of a clear price signal that values
each aspect of the trade-offs. In economic terms, “there is no objective
basis for balancing off distributive benefits against allocative costs.”86
This is a recipe for subjective decision-making—albeit, thanks to the EIS
page count, it wears a veneer of documentation.
Both regulators and policymakers should more clearly articulate
what “the public interest” entails in terms of the granularity of regulatory
consideration. Should it entail the preservation of a species? Yes. Should
it entail making sure the water is a few degrees colder so that a species
prevalent in other areas can overcome inter-species competition in this
project’s reservoir? Perhaps not. In this regard, procedural reforms that
either streamline the regulatory approvals needed for certain projects,
hasten the process, or extend the lifespan of the license are detailed in the
next section. They would be welcome, albeit tacit, declarations that the
public interest is not well served if transaction costs make smaller projects
unviable. Likewise, as the final section of this paper details, statutory
reforms should minimize transaction costs by imposing on regulatory

86.

Posner, supra note 59, at 44.
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agencies, not licensees, requirements that the processes be more timely, as
well as less subjective.
III. REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
The difficulties associated with the hydroelectric licensing
processes are notorious. They have become only more complex over time.
In 1998, FERC and other federal agencies formed an Interagency Task
Force to Improve Hydroelectric Licensing Processes (ITF).87 The ITF
recognized the need for more straightforward hydroelectric licensing, and
issued a series of reports and recommendations in 2001.88 Ultimately, the
ITF resulted in the creation of FERC’s current default licensing process,
the ILP, which as previously discussed, is still lengthy and burdensome to
applicants. It is apparent that more improvements are necessary. While
major changes will be necessary to prompt significant improvement in the
efficiency of the process, certain smaller changes can be achieved now, to
more immediate effect.
In 2017, the President issued the Executive Order on Promoting
Energy Independence and Economic Growth, which recognizes that it is
in the national interest to promote development of energy resources,
including electricity derived from flowing water.89 The Executive Order
called on federal agencies, including FERC, to identify existing
regulations that potentially burden the development and use of domestic
energy resources.90 In response, FERC recently issued a report whereby
it identified three areas where “material burdens” may exist for applicants

87.
Interagency Task Force, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n. (Jun.
28, 2010), available at https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/indus-act/itf.asp.
88.
Id.
89.
Presidential Exec. Order on Promoting Energy Independence and
Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13,783 (2017) available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-orderpromoting-energy-independence-economic-growth/.
90.
Id.
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seeking a hydroelectric license.91 These include the licensing process,
exemption process, and determinations on deficient applications.92 FERC
also proposed possible solutions. In addition to the solutions proposed by
FERC in its report, collaboration and delegation within the licensing
process and conditioned licensing offer additional opportunites for
increased efficiency.
A. Streamlining FERC’s Licensing Process
In its report, FERC asserted that eliminating the need to seek
permission prior to pursuing the TLP or ALP may save time and reduce
costs to applicants.93 Allowing applicants to pursue the licensing
processes that best fits their specific situation, whether that be the TLP or
ALP, without seeking FERC’s approval first, is a small change, but a step
in the right direction. FERC should also consider the necessity of having
three separate licensing processes in the first place. None of the processes
are particularly streamlined, including the default ILP, which was meant
to alleviate concerns regarding the burdensome nature of licensing.
Choosing between the three processes only increases confusion on the part
of applicants, and forces applicants to weigh the potential costs of
attempting to pursue one process over another. Ideally, a single,
streamlined process would exist. That is perhaps easier said than done,
however, and in the absence of such a process, allowing applicants to
freely pursue the most appropriate process, without the additional
procedure of seeking FERC’s blessing, would be beneficial.
FERC also proposed making optional the draft license application
or preliminary licensing proposal.94 A draft application must respond “to
any comments and recommendations made by any resource agency and

91.
Review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Agency Actions
Pursuant to Executive Order 13,783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic
Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,517 (Nov. 1, 2017).
92.
Id. at 50,519.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
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Indian tribe either during the first stage of consultation,”95 or to any
requests for studies or information that are made after the first stage of
consultation.96 A preliminary licensing proposal describes the project,
describes the operation and maintenance plans, and includes a draft
environmental analysis.97 Releasing applicants from the obligation to
provide either a draft license application or a preliminary licensing
proposal would certainly help an applicant cut through the licensing
morass. However, there are a few reasons why this proposal would not be
as beneficial to applicants as it may appear. First, there is already a
provision which allows for an applicant to receive a waiver of the draft
license application or preliminary licensing proposal requirement.98
Removing the need to seek the waiver does relieve some burden. Yet,
making the draft license application or preliminary licensing proposal
optional only defers inevitable conflict. Additionally, FERC suggested
that the ILP may be burdensome in terms of the schedule established for
the pre-filing process.99 Its proposed solution is to reduce certain
timeframes, including the time frame in which an applicant must file a
revised study plan, for example.100 Such a change would hardly relieve
burden on the applicant. The time frames that should be shortened are the
timeframes for stakeholders to submit comments, which FERC does
suggest.101 Only then will the burden on the applicant be relieved. The
applicant’s obligations are already so numerous that forcing applicants to
adhere to stricter timeframes does not provide relief. In addition, the time
saving that results from shortening some timeframes in the ILP is a mere
three months. For a process that currently takes years, three months are
negligible.
95.
18 C.F.R. § 4.38(c)(4)(i).
96.
18 C.F.R. § 4.38(c)(ii).
97.
18 C.F.R. § 5.16 (2017).
98.
18 C.F.R. § 5.16(f).
99.
Review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Agency Actions
Pursuant to Executive Order 13,783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic
Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,517 at 50,519.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
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Current licensing practice is to set a thirty-year license term, even
when there is little redevelopment, construction, or environmental
mitigation and enhancement.102 Pursuant to the FPA, FERC can issue a
hydroelectric license “for a period not exceeding fifty years.”103 FERC
should immediately begin issuing licenses for no less than 50 years. This
change in policy is easily implemented and will result in enormous
positive impact for applicants. Reducing the frequency of relicensing, a
process which, as discussed, is extremely convoluted and slow, will
provide one of the most tangible improvements from the applicant’s
perspective.
Minimum applicant filing requirements is another area where
FERC identified a burden that could be reduced. Presently, FERC
regulations allow for a less grueling licensing process for small water
projects with 5 megawatts (MW) or less installed capacity.104 Projects
with an installed capacity of greater than 5 MW are subject to more
requirements and a more complex process.105 FERC asserted that this 5
MW distinction was the result of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA), which was implemented in part to encourage hydroelectric
power production at existing small dams.106 PURPA mandates “simple
and expeditious licensing procedures . . . for small hydroelectric power
projects in connection with existing dams.”107 PURPA called for
exemptions from licensing requirements for small hydroelectric power
projects with an installed capacity of 5 MW or less.108 However, PURPA
was amended and now a small water project is one with an installed
capacity of 10 MW or less.109 FERC posits that updating its regulations to
treat a 5-10 MW project the same as a 5 MW or less project could alleviate
102.
Id. at 50,520.
103.
16 U.S.C. § 799 (2012).
104.
18 C.F.R. §§ 4.60-4.61 (2017).
105.
18 C.F.R. §§ 4.40-4.41 (2017); 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.50-4.51 (2017).
106.
16 U.S.C. § 2701.
107.
16 U.S.C. § 2705(a).
108.
Pub. L. 96-294, title IV, § 408(b).
109.
16 U.S.C. § 2705(d); Review of Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Agency Actions Pursuant to Executive Order 13,783, Promoting Energy
Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,517.
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burden on applicants. This is an obviously reasonable reform. Smaller,
less impactful projects should not be subject to the same licensing process
and requirements as large projects which have a greater impact on the
surrounding environment and communities. Subjecting small projects to
extensive processes is inefficient and unnecessary. The process should be
tailored to fit the size and potential impact of the project. FERC’s
regulations should be updated to reflect the amendment of PURPA.
B. Increasing Availability of Exemptions and Second Chances
Regarding the exemption process, FERC has identified the
requirement that a project add new capacity in order to qualify for an
exemption as a potential burden.110 Specifically, FERC had previously
determined that to qualify for a particular license exemption, a project
must be one “in which capacity will be installed or increased” to a “total
installed capacity of not more than 10 MW.”111 FERC proposes revising
the regulations to remove the requirement of installing or increasing
capacity to be eligible for this particular exemption. FERC should do this
and more. Increasing the availability of exemptions, and making it easier
to seek and obtain them, will also aid in ending the one-size-fits-all
approach to licensing. Certain projects, specifically those that are smaller
or unlikely to have a significant impact, should be granted exemptions.
The requirement to add new capacity is arbitrary and results in excluding
otherwise appropriate projects from exemptions. In many cases a faster,
simpler process with minimal participation from other entities is
appropriate. Such a process especially makes sense when seeking to
relicense. In such situations, stakeholders likely had the opportunity to
weigh in earlier. Exemptions can help ensure that the process fits the
project. Additionally, FERC has suggested allowing dismissed exemption
applications to be converted into an application for a license, eliminating
extra work on the part of the applicant.112 This proposal is an obvious and
110.
111.
112.

Id.
18 C.F.R. § 4.30(b)(31); see also 18 C.F.R. § 4.103 (2017).
82 Fed. Reg. 50,517.
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easy solution. Along those same lines, when it comes to deficient
applications, FERC has raised the possibility of changing the regulations
that prevent an applicant from refiling a rejected application.113 If an
applicant corrects deficiencies, refiling should be permitted. Likewise, to
be relicensed, applicants must follow specific requirements, and failure to
do so results in a rejected application that cannot be refiled.114 Such a
situation represents a disastrous turn of events for a project attempting to
obtain a subsequent license. Applicants undergoing the relicensing
process should be permitted to correct deficiencies. The consequences of
an existing hydroelectric resource being unable to correct an application
for a subsequent license far outweigh the fault of making a mistake in the
application.
C. Collaboration, Delegation, and the Promise of Conditioned
Licenses
Increasing regulatory efficiencies would be easier if FERC acted as
the sole authority in matters of hydroelectric licensing. However, as we
know from statutory law and case law, this is not the reality. Multiple
federal agencies now wield considerable influence in the process. Rather
than serving in a mere advisory role, certain agencies, pursuant to laws
discussed above, are empowered to impose mandatory conditions.
Therefore, no improvements can be made without the cooperation of these
agencies. Some progress on this front has already occurred. FERC has
entered into a number of memoranda of understanding (MOU) with other
entities, which aim to improve teamwork and process efficiency.115 One
MOU, executed in 2016 between FERC and the Army Corps of Engineers,
is intended to streamline the process required to authorize hydroelectric

113.
Id. at 50,519–20.
114.
18 C.F.R. § 16.9(b)(4) (2017).
115.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Memoranda of
Understanding (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/mou.asp (last visited Feb.
4, 2018).
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development at Corps dams.116 MOUs between FERC and federal
resource agencies, especially the ones empowered to place conditions on
licenses, could increase early and effective cooperation, which potentially
results in an easier and faster process. As discussed, states, largely due to
the CWA, are also powerful stakeholders in licensing of dams. An MOU
between FERC and the California State Water Resources Control Board
coordinates pre-application activities, such as consultation, environmental
scoping, study planning, and commenting on the applicant’s preliminary
licensing proposal for proposed hydroelectric projects.117 The consultation
requirements, environmental scoping, and studies are perhaps the largest
impediments to an efficient licensing process. It is encouraging that this
MOU addresses these problem areas in the process. FERC has also
entered into an MOU with the State of Colorado, to simplify the
authorization of small scale hydroelectric projects.118 The MOU delegates
certain tasks to the state, including prescreening projects for eligibility,
and consulting with federal and state agencies, tribes, and the public.119
Further delegation of authority to states may be a viable method of
increasing the efficiency of the licensing process. States are more aware
of local attitudes toward hydroelectric development.120 States typically
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have a better handle on local environmental conditions.121 States may also
be less cumbersome than the federal government and can implement
policies faster.122 A possible solution, one which furthers the objective of
abolishing the one-size-fits-all approach to licensing, is simply to cede
authority for the regulation of small hydroelectric projects entirely to the
states.123 Recalling the history of hydroelectric regulation, the federal
government consolidated the federal preemption of hydroelectric
regulation with the FWPA and the subsequent FPA.124 The environmental
legislation of the 1970s served to decentralize FERC’s authority over
hydroelectric regulation, spreading it out amongst other federal agencies,
as well as states. Perhaps, in the name of a more case specific and less
arduous licensing process, this trend should continue full circle with
significant regulatory authority granted to the states.
Conditioned licenses are another highly effective way in which to
improve process efficiency. In 2007, FERC issued a Policy Statement on
Conditioned Licenses for Hydrokinetic Projects.125 Essentially, FERC can
issue a license once it has completed its processing of license applications,
but while actions required of other entities are still pending.126 Ideally,
this policy should apply to all hydroelectric licenses. This would entirely
remove the need to begin the protracted licensing process years ahead of
the application deadline. Rather, the process of working with stakeholders
could continue, while the process over which FERC has control could be
completed more efficiently. It would also be advantageous for applicants
and other entities to reach agreements amongst themselves, without the
need of involving FERC at all. FERC’s expertise does not include cultural
resources or recreation. There is no reason for FERC to serve in a capacity
121.
Id.
122.
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123.
George William Sherk, Approaching a Gordian Knot: The
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at 377-78.
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to enforce such agreements between the applicant and private interests.
Such agreements should be excluded from the formal licensing process
entirely, and should not take the form of conditions on FERC issued
licenses. MOUs could accomplish the same goals much more efficiently
in a manner far more rational.
On the other hand, as long as other agencies and private interests
remain vital parts of hydroelectric licensing, the licensing processes
themselves need improvement. The ALP and ILP clearly signify attempts
by FERC to encourage collaboration between the masses of interested
parties involved in hydroelectric licensing. They also represent an
understanding by FERC that applicants, and the innumerable stakeholders,
often cannot be left to their own devices. These processes represent an
evolution over time from FERC as the expert evaluator of a license
application, to becoming an entity tasked with guiding a group of
demanding parties with potentially contradictory interests through a long,
thorny process. FERC has signaled its preference that parties simply work
things out amongst themselves.127 However, the ALP, the most
collaborative of the three processes, is not the default process; rather, the
ILP is the default. As discussed above, the ILP only contemplates dispute
resolution of study disputes, leaving many potential disputes with no
alternative resolution mechanism to employ. Furthermore, in the ILP,
rather than forcing parties to reach agreements, FERC essentially resolves
disputes by, for example, formally approving study plans and serving as a
binding arbitrator in cases of study disputes.128 The ILP’s attempt to reach
a speedy resolution is simply the imposition of strict deadlines for
everyone involved, which does not allow the necessary time to engage in
settlement discussions. Conversely, the ALP’s lack of formal decisions
by FERC along the way, absence of binding dispute resolution, and
nonexistence of strict deadlines means the process can be stretched even
beyond the expected duration. Such an outcome may negate any of the
127.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Policy Statement on
Hydropower Licensing Settlements (Sept. 21, 2006), available at https://www.
ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/092106/H-1.pdf.
128.
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benefits of cooperation and consensus that could be achieved. If FERC
hydroelectric licensing is going to remain inundated by other agencies and
private interests, a process that combines some of the structure of the ILP
with the collaboration of the ALP would likely be the more effective.
However, the best approach would be to reduce the power of other federal
agencies and remove stakeholder interests as rent-seekers from the formal
licensing process, which would allow a return to the simplicity of the TLP
of earlier generations. There are a number of improvements to
hydroelectric licensing that are within FERC’s discretion that can be
implemented relatively easily. Unfortunately, for larger improvements,
such as the reduction in authority granted to other federal agencies,
statutory changes will be required.
IV. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
There are three goals toward which statutory reform should aim:
1. Promoting efficiency as a goal of licensure regulation. Congress
should ensure that, in the regulatory process, the federal
government acts more as a singular regulator for the purpose of
licensing, cooperating within itself and doing so on a timely basis.
2. Creating institutional checks against the subjectivity of licensure
regulation. Congress should curtail the power of resource
agencies to unilaterally create conditions, promote a meaningful
consideration of trade-offs within licensure analysis, and
encourage private parties’ assumption of responsibilities for
compensable activities entailed by a public-interest consideration.
3. Exemptions from the standard licensing process. Congress should
make a policy judgment that certain projects are likely to
categorically deliver benefits net of costs or have de minimus
impacts, and are therefore unsuited to the rigor and associated
transaction costs of the intensive status quo of hydroelectric
licensing regulation.
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A. Promoting Efficiency in Licensure Regulation
Both economics and environmental concerns generally should
promote the retention of existing, clean generation over newly capitalized,
fossil-fuel burning generation. Yet, hydroelectric licensing process is
second only to nuclear licensing in terms of the length and cost of the
regulatory process attached to it. Randy Howard, the general manager of
the Northern California Power Agency (NCPA), which serves publicly
owned utilities, notes that hydroelectric projects now compare
unfavorably to natural-gas-fired generating plants. For NCPA’s existing
259-megawatt North Fork Stanislaus River project, Howard expects that
“relicensing the project will take thousands of internal labor hours, a
minimum of 10 years, and [a] cost exceeding $50 million.”129 If one
assumes that this $50 million is evenly distributed throughout that decade,
the total cost of this capital is tens of millions of dollars greater yet.130
Because the investment is a re-license, it would not be offset by any
incremental gains in production at the project. It is capital invested
without the expectation of a return, apart from, the operator hopes, a
preservation of the status quo. Even then, because many licensing
conditions end up decreasing the production of a facility, re-licensing a
facility is akin to investing capital for the sake of a negative marginal
return. For those interested in new hydroelectric projects, the lack of a
return on investment within a decade, together with the uncertainty about
the project’s eventual licensing conditions, would kill many projects in the
due diligence phase. As the adage holds, time is money, and this is
especially true for the capital-intensive power industry. A regulatory
129.
Randy Howard, General Manager, Northern California Power
Agency, Address at the House Natural Res. Subcommittee on Water, Power and
Oceans, (May 3, 2017), available at https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/
eventsingle.aspx?EventID=401856.
130.
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process that lasts a decade can be understood to be a categorical failure.
FERC itself, like many others, has observed that, “The most
effective way to reduce the cost and time of obtaining a hydroelectric
license would be for Congress to make legislative changes necessary to
restore the Commission’s position as the sole federal decisional authority
for licensing conditions and processes.”131 Such a reform should be at the
heart of any legislative proposal to reform hydroelectric licensing.
Since the passage of the FPA, which gave FERC the authority to
issue hydroelectric power licenses to non-federal actors, what had been
conceived of as a one-stop shop has evolved into a leviathan of multiple
agencies. Rather than streamlining those agencies’ advice into a unified
regulatory process, the process as it practically exists is highly balkanized.
Indeed, the primary cause of delay in the licensing process is not the
regulator with the ostensible responsibility to issue the license—FERC—
but instead other government agencies that have a legal duty to evaluate
the project but lack accountability over their share of the
regulatory process.132
FERC, as the issuer of the license, should have the ultimate
accountability, and thus responsibility, for seeing this process to a
transparent, efficient conclusion that affords due process to the applicant.
In order to accomplish this, FERC should be given the authority to impose
mandatory schedules on its sister agencies who have only an adjunct role
in licensure.
The most recent statutory reform proposal would do just that.
Under the bipartisan omnibus energy bill that the leading Republican and
Democrat on the U.S. Senate’s Energy and Natural Resource Committee
have been working on for multiple sessions, FERC would “act as the lead
131.
Devin Hartman and Tom Russo, Ebbing the Flow of Hydropower
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agency for the purposes of coordination of all applicable Federal
authorizations” and for the purpose of complying with NEPA.133 While
the legislative text is not particularly commanding—FERC “shall issue a
rule establishing a process for setting a schedule”134—Sen. Lisa
Murkowski and Sen. Maria Cantwell’s reforms would be the first
significant action in many years to stand as a congressional mandate for
cooperation, and its value should not be understated.135 The draft
legislation would require FERC to issue a scheduling order unique to each
application, which would be binding upon FERC itself and also other
agencies, the applicant, and stakeholders engaged in the process.136 If a
sister agency nonetheless did not follow the FERC-issued deadline, FERC
could refer the matter to the presidential Office of Management and
Budget for resolution.137
B. Creating Institutional Checks Against Regulatory Subjectivity
There are structural reforms that go beyond mere timeliness,
however, which are necessary to ensure an appropriate regulatory process
that does not unduly disadvantage hydropower among rival sources of
electricity. As we have explained above, the current regulatory process
merely purports to engage in a process of economic evaluation the tradeoffs of an individual project’s benefits and costs, while falling short of
actually doing so. Perhaps the main problem here is that multiple
agencies—each with their own institutional interests and subjective lens
of review—are all able to impose mandatory conditions on a licensee. The
result is a process which easily loses sight of the whole of the public
interest, as the case studies above serve to demonstrate.
133.
Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017, S. 1460, § 3001 (July
2017) https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1460/text.
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The U.S. Forest Service, the FWS, and the NMFS should all be
limited to an advisory role, issuing opinions that guide a singular
regulator’s deliberation—namely, FERC’s. The current process, codified
as sections 4(e) and 16 of the FPA, is one which needlessly duplicates
regulators and hamstrings an applicant’s due process because it is seldom
clear whether these agencies are acting as a stakeholder within FERC’s
licensing process, or as an adjudicator of mandatory licensing conditions.
It is also the case that many aspects of a license that should likely be
voluntary or reached through consensus are instead subject to a kind of
bootstrapping, “me-too” regulation of the resource agencies; the Mystic
Dam’s whitewater requirement is one such example. One remedy for this
would be to adopt a more adjudicatory approach in each agency venue,
with more clearly defined roles and schedules. While such a reform could
promote due process, it would have the deleterious effect of further siloing
the process and do damage to an overall attempt to streamline licensure
regulation.
Legislative proposals currently under consideration fall short of
this reform. However, it is clear from their legislative text that the
underlying problems are at least tacitly acknowledged. Senators
Murkowski and Cantwell’s proposal would require the Secretaries of
Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce, or another high-ranking political
appointee, to sign off on their respective resource agencies’ mandatory
license conditions.138 The type of subjectivity identified earlier in this
paper, we surmise, is in part the function of individual bureaucrats or
groups of bureaucrats’ predilections for certain narrow interests, permitted
to them by an insular agency setting.139 Requiring political accountability
for license requirements at a higher level may cause the exercise of
discretion to be more genuinely discretionary. Likewise, disaffected
applicants under the draft legislation could rely on “trial-type hearings” to
dispute a particular license condition, although the administrative law
138.
139.
bureaucracies.
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judge (ALJ) presiding over this process would be statutorily restrained
from finding that “any condition or prescription should be adopted,
modified, or rejected”; the decision would be the relevant Secretary’s.140
The ALJ’s opinion, in other words, would be essentially advisory in
nature, at best scolding an agency for an over-the-top license condition.
Regulation in the name of “the public interest” is the high water
mark of legislative delegation; “as the sole bounds of administrative
decision-making, the standard is so capacious as to permit consideration
of virtually anything that appears before the regulators or stakeholders.”141
As we note above, it is a paradox that a concept so whole, so broad as the
public interest could be derogated to a flyspeck analysis of small things,
in a process which in practical terms lacks an analysis of trade-offs that
NEPA purports to codify. Remedying this flaw is, in the main, an
administrative and not a statutory undertaking. However, Congress could
permit, as the Murkowski-Cantwell legislation would, FERC to undertake
regional studies that would speak to multiple licenses within a particular
basin, watershed, or river.142 Such studies would inform on a more whole
basis the trade-offs of hydropower, and could render moot a needless
series of ad hoc studies undertaken for individual, similar projects.
Likewise, a requirement imposed on the regulator to compile best
practices in methodologies for the studies antecedent to licensure would
provide a trustworthy benchmark for applicants and the consultants who
undertake biological and other studies.143 The way bureaucracies are
staffed is another important consideration. Agencies are people, at the end
of the day, and rotating staff between responsible agencies and even tying
personnel performance reviews to a staff member’s willingness to be
seconded to a sister regulator is an innovative proposal to erase siloing—
in any case, it could not make matters any worse.144 Again, it bears
140.
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mentioning that these statutory enactments’ practical success relies
primarily on agencies, and thus it should be contrasted to a deeper reform
that puts FERC in a position as the singular arbiter of licensure.
The hydroelectric licensing process will always be subjective
because of its character as a central planning exercise orbiting around a
vague mandate. Nevertheless, there are ways that stakeholders could be
expected to better define the value of a condition to them. This would
allow the regulator to insist that stakeholders extracting a condition put
their money where their mouths are, rather than allowing them to simply
claim a public good in the regulatory process and having it attached by fiat
to the license. Consider again the case of Mystic Dam. The whitewater
kayakers whose interest group obtained a license condition at Montana’s
West Rosebud Creek are said to not even make particularly frequent use
of their federally authorized entitlement of whitewater flows manufactured
by foregoing hydroelectric production and passing water through the
dam.145 Regardless of whether this is true, surely it is the case that the
value of this kind of recreational licensing requirement exists as a function
of its use. It should be considered, like water rights are in the Western
United States, a usufructory right whose existence depends on its use and
which balances against other uses. In this case, the other use is the
foregone hydroelectric generation, which has a more measurable value
thanks to the commodity market for electricity. In other words, there are
two compensable interests in tension with one another. Both should be
monetized, and the recreationalist interest should be severable from the
hydroelectric licensee to allow a real test in the demand for, and
concomitant willingness to pay for, recreational opportunities. The goal
of such experiments would not necessarily be to extract revenue for the
public coffers or for the hydroelectric licensee from recreationalists, but
instead to measure demand for the recreational opportunity in question.
Only then can a meaningful cost-benefit analysis of this trade-off occur.
A good regulator should be equipped with the statutory power to both
create such a concession, and to eliminate it and the underlying use if it
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goes unused or has a demonstrably insignificant value compared to
alternative uses. The bottom line is that, in the hydroelectric licensing
process, not everything should be an irrevocable entitlement because an
accumulation of stakeholders does not, in itself, equal the public interest.
Statutory reform should promote regulation’s making visible the trade-offs
inherent in hydroelectric licensing.
C. Exemptions From the Standard Licensing Process
Finally, we have seen how even small projects, such as KilarcCow Creek, can be overwhelmed by the transaction costs of the relicensing
process. Congress should radically simplify the relicensing process for
smaller dams. If there are obvious and exceptional problems with their
continued operation, the kind of politically accountable objection
described above could be made to require a more detailed process. In
addition to making license renewal more simple, upgrades to powergenerating equipment and changes in operation undertaken for
environmental reasons should not be subject to extensive regulatory
review.146 To continue the status quo in this regard creates a perverse
incentive where public interest regulation acts as an effective block against
both economic efficiency and environmental interests. It would be strange
indeed if hydroelectric licensing had transaction costs so significant that
only large dams’ licensees would see the economic value in aggressively
pursuing their continued operation, even though it is these large
impoundment dams that have engendered the greatest consternation
among environmentalists.147
Likewise, Congress should make a policy judgment that certain
new hydroelectric projects are likely to categorically deliver benefits net
of costs or have de minimus impacts. These include existing
146.
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147.
MARK REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
DISAPPEARING WATER (1986).

162

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 39

impoundments or hydro infrastructure, where most environmental damage
is a consequence of this structure’s existence, and not the mere addition of
hydroelectric generating unit. Already, previous reforms have led FERC
to categorically exempt new licensees who fit certain qualifications, such
as being installed on existing conduits or non-powered dams.148 The
projects that qualify for the existing exemptions are likely to be especially
useful for the kind of balancing and ramping products, a greater need for
which weather-dependent renewables have imposed on the electric grid.
As is contemplated in the Murkowski-Cantwell legislation, Congress
should also make it easier and quicker to obtain a license at non-powered
dams.149 It should also require better cooperation between FERC and the
federal agencies which own and operate certain dams for the purpose of
increasing hydroelectric production.150
It is, ultimately, up to Congress to make a policy judgment about
whether hydroelectric power—a clean, often dispatchable source which
has no fuel-price risk and adds diversity of supply to the power sector—
should be over-regulated, as it is today, or whether to take steps that
rationalize its regulation in the context of the wider economy for electric
power.
V. CONCLUSION
Hydroelectric licensing was meant to be rigorous, as the original
congressional decision to vest it in a single, powerful federal regulator
makes plain. It was not, however, meant to be arbitrary and self-defeating.
Today, the United States has moved far away from the original structure
of hydroelectric regulation, and not for the better. It is nearly impossible
to find a regulatory process that is more time-consuming, less streamlined,
or more muddled in its public-interest objectives. This has happened not
148.
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because hydroelectric licensing has been the particular object of
congressional reform, in which case Congress might have simply added
new requirements to the pre-existing central regulator. Instead, the
hydroelectric industry has had the misfortune of being swept up in the
expansive congressional enactments of the 1970s and ’80s. Additionally,
tied to nothing but its original statutory mandate of public-interest
regulation, hydroelectric licensing lacks a unifying principle, and it is a
hostage to the institutional subjectivity of administrative agencies. The
administrative and statutory reform proposals that have been enacted in
recent years are a comment on this broken system, and would
incrementally improve the practice of regulation. However, they do not
go far enough to remedy the problems of duplication and ambiguity that
are at the core of a problem that causes regulation of this sector to be
almost irredeemably arbitrary and dilatory.

